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Abstract. Industry 4.0 and cloud manufacturing are emerging trends
to advance the automation and digitization of manufacturing systems.
Both share cloud computing as key enabling technology. However, the
increase in interconnectedness comes with crucial security issues. In this
position paper, we consider a production process in the space domain and
highlight the security challenges which arise when adapting the process
for the Industry 4.0 and cloud manufacturing paradigm.
1 Introduction
Industry 4.0 and cloud manufacturing have lately drawn much attention in
industry and academia, as is demonstrated by the amount of respective literature
in recent years [1,5]. Industry 4.0 is used as an umbrella term covering digitization
and automation in industry and relating to technologies like internet of things,
big data analytic, or cloud computing. Cloud manufacturing transfers cloud
computing to manufacturing by providing a platform for distributed access to a
pool of shared manufacturing resources encapsulated as services. Customers are
then able to send their requirements to the platform to request services covering
all stages of a product life cycle, ranging from product design to maintenance.
While Industry 4.0 and cloud manufacturing promise substantial improve-
ments of the production process in terms of production efficiency and flexibility,
they also pose various challenges. Due to increased automation and intercon-
nectedness of components, security in particular is a major obstacle. In this
position paper, we investigate the security issues arising for a collaborative cloud
production platform, which we are developing in the space domain.
2 Production Platform for the Space Domain
2.1 Product Lifecycle
The European Space Agency divides the life cycle of a spacecraft into seven
phases: 0, A, B, C, D, E, and F [2]. In phase 0, the aim is to find out if a mission
is possible at all, which is refined in phase A by an initial plan and feasibility







Fig. 1. Platform for Spacecraft Production
of the spacecraft and all its components. Assembly, integration, and test are
conducted in phase D, which includes not only the spacecraft but also its ground
segment. During phase E, the spacecraft is launched and operated. Eventually,
the spacecraft is safely disposed in phase F (cf. Fig. 1).
2.2 Collaborative Production Platform
Our long-term development goal is a production platform covering the entire
spacecraft life cycle. We currently focus on planning, which happens in phases 0,
A, B, C. Planning involves several stakeholders, e.g. project initiator, customers,
and manufacturers, and continuous information exchange between them.
DLR’s Concurrent Engineering Facility provides “a guided procedure, the
simultaneous access to multidisciplinary groups of experts to a shared database,
and the direct verbal and medial communication between all the experts” [6].
Together with the tool Virtual Satellite [4], it is used for planning spacecraft
at DLR. Data exchange with manufacturers or other parties in later phases
of a spacecraft life cycle is currently not covered by that collaborative process.
To remedy that, we propose a production platform that allows uniform and
standardized information exchange and is thus freeing stakeholders from the
burden of manually seeking information and tracing the information flow. The
platform enables the flexibility required to meet the needs of the distributed and
multi-level supply chains of the DLR.
There will not be a sudden shift from the current system and, especially,
from current processes and workflows, to the new platform. We think, however,
that working on tools, methods, and standards conjointly with the different
stakeholders is a process which will eventually lead to a platform that all parties
are willing to use. We see the platform as an assembly of services, interfaces, and
tools that enable data exchange in an standardized and automated way.
As a representative example of a process that currently involves a lot of
manual work and which would benefit from automation by machine-readable in-
formation exchange via our platform, we consider the offer management between
a manufacturer and a (potential) customer. In the process, the customer asks
for information (in terms of Request for Information (RFI)). The manufacturer
assembles existing documents, experiences, etc. into a first answer. If the customer
is interested, they agree on a proposal request (Request for proposal (RFP)).
This request already includes information from the customer, like specifications,
requirements, or timetables. The manufacturer then generates an offer, includ-
ing a technical specification of the product. This process involves the frequent
interchange of documents between both sites, even more due to often unique
products or small batches thereof. Compared to other industries, which usually
sell a lot more off-the-shelf products, there is more effort needed to create an
offer. A machine-readable format of the customer’s requirements would allow
for automatically generating and processing offers in a standardized fashion,
implying advantages in terms of elasticity, resource pooling, and self-service.
3 Security Challenges
The increased interconnectedness of customers and vendors in the collaborative
production platform comes together with novel security risks, which can not only
threaten individual parties but also the whole supply chain. We can align these
risks using their relation to confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
3.1 Confidentiality
Most prominently, information exchange on the platform has to be reliable
and safe with respect to data privacy. Multiple vendors are using the platform,
sharing confidential information on component design and competitive pricing.
The customers share confidential information in their RFPs, the manufacturers
in their proposals. Information disclosure should not only be prevented using
measures like encryption and access control, but should also be subject to
incident management as governed by regulations and policies (e.g., Non-Disclosure
Agreement (NDA), Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)) [3]. Access control
is a requirement concerning the entire spacecraft life cycle. For example, data
transmitted from a spacecraft during operation is differentiated into health and
payload data, the latter only accessible to customers. Health data, on the other
hand, must be only accessible to ground control and to manufacturers.
3.2 Integrity
Flexibly provisioning and releasing manufacturing services poses the question of
trust. Trust management has thus to play a key role, addressing both services
and exchanged data, in order to protect the platform from tampering, e.g., by
using malicious components [7]. Related to trust is the tracking of information
flow such that data provenance can be used as reliable measure for data integrity.
This is also true for other industries, but there, in case of malicious components,
components can be replaced, which is impossible for a spacecraft in operation.
3.3 Availability
Eventually, a supply chain on our collaborative production platform relies on the
availability of its supplier services, such that threats to vendors can cause the
entire supply chain to halt, which needs to be subject to any risk-based analysis
of the system’s architecture. For instance, backup infrastructures need to handle
data from different vendors, again raising questions on trust and data integrity.
Furthermore, in the space domain, another aspect of availability is crucial: certain
components and infrastructure are highly critical. As an example, spacecraft
missions are planned with dedicated ground stations. Switching to a different
station in case of defect, or just moving the ground station’s time frame, is rather
difficult due to irrevocable parameters like location, frequency, and bandwidth.
4 Related Work
Various surveys on Industry 4.0 and cloud manufacturing identify security as an
obstacle [1,5]. Due to space constraints, we refer to those surveys and provide just
a brief summary next. Data breaches are the most prominent security concern, due
to data typically touching a company’s core competencies. Besides confidentiality
of shared data, integrity and availability of data or collaborating services have
also been considered critical (e.g., [7]). Most similar to our work is [1], where the
authors study security issues in the whole product life cycle. We see our paper as
a complement to the more abstract and summarizing discussion of [1], in that we
consider the concrete case of a production platform in the space domain.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have outlined security issues arising when developing a produc-
tion platform in the space domain based on Industry 4.0 and cloud manufacturing.
As advocated by the idea of secure-by-design, we believe that building security in
– from the start – helps in developing a secure and reliable production platform.
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